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1 Introduction
The number of interest groups active in the U.S. polity has been dramatically increased
over the last four decades, going from 5000 in 1955 to over 33000 at the end of the twen-
tieth century.1 Major political scientists like Huntington (1975), Salisbury (1990) and
Wilson (1979) among others have viewed the proliferation of interests as indicative of a
more fragmented and atomistic political system. This tremendous increase in the num-
ber of interest groups may not only reflect a huge diversity in their objectives, in their
audiences and in the related economic issues at stake but it may also be more surely
related to the structure of the fundamental transaction costs which shape interactions in
the political arena. Even though understanding the general macro-organization of inter-
est groups is of a tantamount importance to explain the design and implementation of
economic policies, still very little is known on the fundamental incentives which induce
those groups to merge or to stay split apart. Indeed, even if the number of interest groups
has raised, the pattern of behavior and the mix of competition and cooperation among
those groups is more complex. This important fact of modern politics has been noticed
by several political scientists, most noticeably Hula (1999) who argued that “the macroe-
conomic view of the interest groups community often overlooks a number of institutional
links between interest groups, most notably the increasing use of long-term, recurrent, and
institutionalized coalitions in many policy arenas”.
In this paper, we present a theoretical framework to understand this macro organi-
zation of the lobbying activity. This framework is based on the by-now well admitted
fact, both among political scientists and economists, that lobbying has an important in-
formational role.2 Lobbyists spend time and resources to convey information on their
preferences to uninformed political decision-makers and help them making choices which
may please their own interests. That lobbying groups have private information puts them
in a unique position to influence policy-making at least on the very issues on which their
private interests are at stake. Because there may exist a conflict between the preferences
of policy-makers and those of interest groups, the latters have incentives to manipulate
information. The implemented policies result thus from a trade-off between choosing a
rigid policy independent on the interest group preferences and communicating with the
interest group to implement a more flexible policy but at the cost of letting the preferences
of this group drive policy choice.
Informational asymmetries are thus crucial to understand the relationships between
lobbying groups and policy-makers. Clearly, those asymmetries not only explain much of
1As a further example, the Encyclopedia of Associations (2002) counts more than 115,000 U.S. non-
profit organizations with State, city and local scope and interests.
2See Milbrath (1963), Wright (1990), Hansen (1991) and more recently Grossman and Helpman (2001).
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the policies implemented in practice but also generate the transaction costs that plague
the relationships between policy-makers and interest groups. The overall organization
of lobbying should then certainly be driven by the desire to minimize these transaction
costs. Asymmetric information clearly provides thus a valuable perspective on the scope
and size of interest groups, an issue which has been of great interest since at least the
seminal work of Olson (1965).
To understand first how informational asymmetries shapes policy design, we start with
a simple relationship involving a single interest group and a policy-maker both having
different ideal points in a one-dimensional space of policy. The interest group has private
information on his ideal point which is relevant to determine the optimal policy from the
decision-maker’s viewpoint. In that simple context, we analyze the determinants of the
policy choice. As the conflict of interests between the interest group and the policy-maker
is more pronounced, a rigid policy involving pooling across a larger set of preference
profiles becomes more attractive. Communication is less valuable when the interest group
has stronger incentives to manipulate information to influence decision-making. The same
is true when the decision-maker has already a relatively precise idea of the interest group’s
preferences. Indeed, as the distribution of these preferences puts more weight around its
mean, the decision-maker relies less on active communication. The optimal policy rule
comes closer to the ex ante optimal rigid policy that the policy-maker chooses without
relying on the interest group’s information.
This informativeness effect is particularly crucial to understand one first force which
could justify the formation of large interest groups. Consider indeed two interest groups
with independently and identically distributed shocks on their ideal points who share their
information in a credible way and merge as one active player. That coalition only needs
to communicate the average preferences of the two groups to the decision-maker. This
piece of information is less noisy than the type of each individual interest group taken
separately. Dealing with such a coalition, the policy-maker gets a more precise idea of
the relevant preferences profile and, by the same token, does not need to rely so much on
communication.3 There exist thus strong scope economies due to communicating private
information.
Those scope economies favor the emergence of large coalitional groups compared with
smaller ones holding more diffuse private information which is harder to communicate.
Although intuitive, this insight turns out to be incomplete. When all interest groups
merge as one, the statistics used by this coalition to communicate with the decision-
maker may indeed be too rough to describe with enough precision the exact preferences
3In the limit, the Law of Large Numbers would apply and a coalition of a large number of potential
interest groups with preferences independently distributed would provide very accurate information to
the decision-maker.
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profile. The information aggregation which already takes place within such a large group
smooths out large discrepancies in the preferences of his individual members and cannot
account for the diversity of opinions. Indeed, because less communication is needed with a
coalition, a rigid policy is chosen for a larger set of preference profiles and, most noticeably,
when the preferences of the groups are sufficiently far away from each other. A better
communication pattern can then be implemented with a decentralized mechanism such
that either one or the other group’s ideal point is ultimately chosen by the policy-maker.
Either group becomes then residual claimant for the policy implemented depending on how
close he is to the decision-maker. When the conflict of interests between the principal and
the interest groups is sufficiently pronounced, it is more efficient to deal separately with
each of them than with a coalition.The corresponding decentralized mechanism improves
both the decision-maker and the interest groups’ expected payoffs. This screening effect
justifies that it can be preferable to keep interest groups apart from each other even
though this decentralized organization may not enjoy the scope economies of merging
highlighted above. For lower levels of conflict instead, the informativeness effect dominates
and justifies that a coalition of interest groups emerges.
To derive those insights on the organizational pattern of lobbying activity, we de-
part significantly from the existing literature on the informational role of interest groups.
Starting with the seminal paper of Crawford and Sobel (1982), this literature has viewed
lobbying groups as informed Stackelberg leaders in the communication game played with
policy-maker.4 Although attractive on positive grounds, that approach faces some diffi-
culties when it comes to discuss the overall organization of lobbying. Cheap-talk signaling
games are generally plagued with a multiplicity of inefficient partition equilibria5 and in
the absence of a convincing equilibrium refinement, the comparison of outcomes between
alternative scenarios and organizational forms is only indicative of the forces shaping the
overall organization of lobbying groups. Instead, we adopt in this paper a mechanism
design perspective.6 We revert the timing of standard lobbying games and assume that
the policy-maker commits ex ante to a mechanism describing policy choices as a function
of the various messages that might be sent by lobbyists on their preference profiles at
the communication stage. This approach is in lines with Melumad and Shibano (1991)
who earlier adopted that perspective although in the context of a single informed agent
and Baron and Meirowitz (2001) who more recently offered some further links between
the signaling and the mechanism design approach.7 The mechanism design approach is
useful on normative grounds because the Revelation Principle gives us a complete char-
4See Austen-Smith (1997) and Grossman and Helpman (2001) for synthetic views of this approach.
5A noticeable exception is the multidimensional world described in Battaglini (2002).
6Laffont (2000) offers a more general defense of this perspective to explain constitutional choices.
7More specifically, these authors argue that with a convenient modeling of out-of equilibrium beliefs
capturing the lack of commitment assumption included in the signaling perspective, the two approaches
are equivalent.
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acterization of the whole set of implementable allocations achieved as equilibria8 of the
communication game played by lobbies. The comparison between the costs and benefits
of different organizational forms of lobbying and the corresponding optimal mechanisms
is thus facilitated.
Our normative approach comes also very close to the social choice literature which,
following the seminal work of Moulin (1980),9 has analyzed incentive compatible mecha-
nisms in political contexts with single-peaked preferences as we do here. Contrary to most
of this literature, we restrict the domain of preferences to quadratic ones. This of course
leads us to describe a slightly larger set of dominant strategy mechanisms than without
this restriction10 and to characterize those mechanisms with a differentiable approach.
More importantly, this restriction on preferences allows us to compare the expected pay-
offs that interest groups and the policy-maker obtain under various organizational forms.
This is an important step of the analysis to get some normative insights on why groups
coalesce or not.
Even though our mechanism design approach can be viewed as an alternative to the
signaling literature in order to address the organization of lobbying, this literature has
already provided valuable insights on those issues by comparing equilibria outcomes.
Austen-Smith (1990, 1993a, 1993b) has analyzed communication patterns when groups
report either sequentially or simultaneously. Krishna and Morgan (2000) have studied a
lobbying game with two informed lobbyists who share the same information on the state
of nature but may have conflicting or congruent views on what should be the optimal
policy.11 They showed that conflicting views help the policy-maker to extract informa-
tion. Our mechanism design perspective would predict in such a context the existence of
a costless fully communicative equilibria irrespectively of the bias.12 This leads us to focus
on the case where each interest group has private information. Grossman and Helpman
(2001, Chapter 4) have also compared the informativeness of various equilibria depend-
ing on whether the lobbyists messages are public or private, an issue which is also put
aside by the mechanism design approach.13 Finally, Battaglini and Benabou (2003) have
recently analyzed the incentives of interest groups to coalesce or not using the signaling
approach. They study a common value environment where the extend of one group’s lob-
8Modulo an implementation concept and here we will focus on dominant strategy for simplicity.
9See also Sprumont (1995) for a survey of this literature.
10Roughly speaking, discontinuous mechanisms are possible in our framework whereas they are not if
the set of preferences is larger.
11See Lipman and Seppi (1995) also.
12This would be obtained by using a revelation mechanism a` la Maskin. The issue may nevertheless
be the existence of other non-truthful equilibria.
13Indeed, the fact that communication with each interest group is publicly observable is part of the
mechanism. Relaxing that assumption would move us towards a third-best world where bilateral commu-
nication between the decision-maker and each interest group may create some scope for vertical collusion.
On this issue in a related model, see Gromb and Martimort (2004).
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bying depends on whether other groups show up in the lobbying process and on whether
the decision-maker finds those activities trustworthy or not. Even though their method-
ology and the informational structure they use both differ from ours, we share with them
results which are qualitatively similar. For small levels of conflict, they also show that
a coalition of interest groups is preferred whereas a non-coordinated behavior dominates
otherwise.
Section 2 presents the model. In Section 3, we derive the optimal mechanism which
maximizes the expected payoff of the policy-maker when there is a single interest group.
We give sufficient conditions for that mechanism to be continuous and highlight then
its simple structure. Continuity is important to get a simple characterization of optimal
mechanisms which is more easily amenable to comparisons between different organiza-
tional forms. We provide there also some comparative statics analyzing the impact of
the level of conflict between the policy-maker and the interest groups and the role of
the informativeness of the distribution of the latter’s ideal point. This section is thus of
independent value for readers interested in the mechanism design approach for lobbying
games. In Section 4, we analyze the scope economies which arise when two groups co-
alesce to influence a policy-maker. Finally, in Section 5, we compare two organizations
of the playing field for lobbying: one with a coalition of two groups, the other with two
competing groups. We highlight there the better possibilities for screening which arise in
the decentralized organization where groups remain split apart, at least when the conflict
of interests is large enough. Section 6 concludes. Proofs are relegated to an Appendix.
2 The Model
In the economy, there are n special interest groups (or agents) indexed by 1, . . . , n
and a single policy-maker (or principal). The policy q chosen by the principal is one-
dimensional.14 Interest groups have single-peaked quadratic preferences with ideal points
θi:
Ui(q, θi) = −1
2
(q − θi)2.
The principal aggregates the preferences of those interest groups but may also take
into account the preferences of the rest of society. We capture this effect in assuming that
the principal also a quadratic utility function given by:
V (q, θ1, . . . , θn) = −1
2
(
q − 1
n
(
n∑
i=1
θi
)
− δ
)2
.
14This can be a tax or an import tariff for instance.
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The parameter δ > 0 represents the bias in the preferences of the policy-maker compared
to the benchmark policy which would consist in averaging the interest groups’ ideal points.
That the policy-maker cares also on the interests of the general public even though it is not
organized as an active lobby might be justified if, for instance, he has reelection concerns.
Importantly, the principal and the agents have non-monotonic preferences, a condition
which is necessary for communication between the principal and the agents to take place
in a mechanism design framework without monetary transfers.15
Interest group i has private information on his ideal point θi. The preference parame-
ters θ1, . . . , θn are drawn identically and independently on the same interval Θ = [θ, θ¯] ac-
cording to the cumulative distribution F (·) which has an atomless and everywhere positive
density f = F ′. We will sometimes assume that F (·) is log-concave (i.e. d
dθ
(
F (θ)
f(θ)
)
> 0).
We denote by Ef (θ) the expectation of θ according to f(·). Note that our formulation is
such that all groups have a priori the same conflict with the principal even though ex post
their ideal points may differ. They both tend to prefer on average a more conservative
policy than the principal’s ideal point.16
We follow a mechanism design approach where the principal commits to a policy
rule stipulating which decision should be made as a function of the lobbyists’ reports on
their preferences. From the Revelation Principle, there is indeed no loss of generality in
restricting the principal to offer a direct revelation mechanism {q(θˆ1, . . . , θˆn)}θˆi∈Θ which
is truthful. When we deal with multiple interest groups, we use dominant strategies as
the implementation concept.
The motivation for the commitment assumption is two fold. From a practical viewpoint
first, this assumption seems reasonable. The principal may have already promised to
the interest groups which have earlier contributed to his electoral campaign a particular
policy platform to respond to their needs. He must thus stick to this scheme when
in office to maintain his reputation in view of raising future campaign contributions.
More importantly maybe, the commitment assumption is also attractive because it solves
the equilibrium indeterminacy that arises in the signaling environment where lobbyists
would move first. The mechanism design approach allows also a full characterization of
communication patterns achievable at any equilibrium of a communication game among
the agents. This property seems also quite attractive as far as one is concerned with the
normative comparison between various organizational forms of lobbying.
The timing of the lobbying game is as follows. First, each lobbyist observes only his
own preferences. Second, the policy-maker offers a mechanism {q(θˆ1, . . . , θˆn)}θˆi∈Θ. Third,
15It is well known that this is also true for the signaling version of the model.
16This assumption is mainly done to simplify. We could account for differences among interest groups
in the directions in which they want the policy to be pushed by having preferences being drawn from
different supports.
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the lobbyists report their preferences to the policy-maker. Fourth, the corresponding
policy is implemented.
For further references, let us determine the policy chosen when the policy-maker knows
the whole vector of preferences (θ1, . . . , θn). The first-best policy chosen by the principal
is then:
q∗(θ1, . . . , θn) =
1
n
(
n∑
i=1
θi
)
+ δ. (1)
Instead, the principal could remain uninformed on the preferences profile and commit
ex ante to a policy without communicating with interest groups. He would then choose
a rigid policy qp to maximize an ex ante criterion, namely −1
2
∫ θ¯
θ
(q − θ − δ)2f(θ)dθ, and
thus
qp = δ + Ef (θ).
Remark: By the Law of Large Numbers, the complete information policy converges
towards the rigid policy when the number of agents is large. This effect is of a particular
importance in view of what follows. It already suggests that communication is in fact less
needed as the principal faces more interest groups.
3 One Interest Group
Let us suppose that the principal faces a single privately informed interest group.
Incentive compatibility constraints for that group write as:
−1
2
(q(θ)− θ)2 ≥ −1
2
(q(θˆ)− θ)2 ∀(θ, θˆ) ∈ Θ2. (2)
The principal’s mechanism design problem can thus be expressed as:
max
{q(·)}
−1
2
∫ θ¯
θ
(q(θ)− θ − δ)2f(θ)dθ
subject to (2).
3.1 Incentive Compatibility
The general structure of the set of incentive compatible mechanisms with quadratic pref-
erences can be easily derived following the work of Melumad and Shibano (1991).
8
Lemma 1 : (Melumad and Shibano (1991)17) An incentive compatible scheme q(·) must
satisfy the following conditions:
• q(θ) is weakly increasing and thus almost everywhere differentiable;
• if q(θ) is strictly increasing, q(θ) = θ;
• if q(θ) is discontinuous at a point θ1 then:
− q(θ+1 ) + q(θ−1 ) = 2θ1, (3)
− q(θ) is flat on the right and the left of θ1,
− q(θ1) belongs to the pair {q(θ−1 ), q(θ+1 )}.
The proof of this lemma is instructive because it yields some insights on the nature of
incentive compatible schemes. At any differentiability point of q(·), we must indeed have:
(q(θ)− θ)q˙(θ) = 0 (4)
This incentive constraint is satisfied by two interesting classes of schemes: the pooling
ones where q(θ) = q on all Θ, and the fully separating one corresponding to the interest
group’s ideal point, q(θ) = θ on all Θ. The optimal mechanism will be a compromise
between such schemes.
In what follows and for tractability, we focus on continuous mechanisms by first provid-
ing a general condition which guarantees that the optimal mechanism is indeed continuous
and, second, by giving examples of distributions which satisfy this required property.
Continuous mechanisms have a simple form in our environment. It can be easily seen
that they have at most one strictly increasing part. Typically, let us denote θˆ1 and θˆ2 the
boundary of the segment where q(θ) = θ, a continuous scheme writes as:
q(θ) = min{θˆ2,max{θ, θˆ1}}. (5)
The reader accustomed with the social choice literature will have recognized the min-
max rule (at least in the case of one agent only) due to Moulin (1980). Moulin’s charac-
terization of dominant strategy incentive mechanisms was obtained by assuming that the
domain of single-peaked preferences is much larger than the specific quadratic preferences
we use throughout. The cost of such an enlargement is that the differentiable approach we
17Melumad and Shibano (1991) have proved this lemma for general single-peaked utility functions
satisfying the single-crossing property. We get a shorter proof by specializing to the quadratic case.
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rely on is lost. Incidentally, the comparison of Lemma 1 and Moulin’s result shows that
enlarging the preferences domain only rules out discontinuous schemes. This robustness
of continuous schemes when preferences go beyond quadratic might be viewed as another
justification to focus on schemes given in (5). Even if one is not ready to focus a priori on
those continuous schemes, the next Lemma provides a sufficient condition on the types
distribution to ensure that the optimal mechanism is actually continuous with quadratic
preferences.
Lemma 2 : The optimal mechanism is continuous at any point x ∈ Θ if for any ∆ ≥ 0:18
δ (2F (x)− F (x−∆)− F (x+ ∆))−
∫ x
x−∆
F (y)dy +
∫ x+∆
x
F (y)dy ≥ 0. (6)
Condition (6) is somewhat weaker than requiring the concavity of the cumulative dis-
tribution F (·). However, for any decreasing density f(·), the optimal mechanism is in fact
continuous. Lemma 2 shows that, under condition (6), any scheme with a discontinuity
at a point x is dominated by a continuous scheme which follows the most preferred policy
of the interest group on an interval around x.
Several quite standard distributions satisfy condition (6). Let us give two examples:
Example 1: Uniform distribution on [θ, θ¯], f(θ) = 1
θ¯−θ .
19
Example 2: Folded normal on [0,+∞[, f(θ) = 2√
2pi
e−
θ2
2 .
3.2 Optimal Mechanism
We are now ready to give a simple characterization of the optimal mechanism when
continuity is ensured.
Proposition 1 : Assume that condition (6) holds, that the distribution F (·) is strictly
log-concave, and that the degree of conflict between the policy-maker and the interest group
is not too severe, i.e., δ <
∫ θ¯
θ
F (y)dy = θ¯−Ef (θ). The optimal mechanism is then unique,
continuous and has the following features:
q(θ) = max{θ, θˆ}
where the cut-off θˆ is uniquely defined by the condition
δ =
1
F (θˆ)
∫ θˆ
θ
F (θ)dθ = θˆ − Ef (θ|θ ≤ θˆ). (7)
18If x+∆ > θ¯ or x−∆ < θ then in (6) x+∆ is replaced by θ¯ and x−∆ is replaced by θ correspondingly.
19For that case, Melumad and Shibano (1991) proved directly the continuity of the optimal scheme.
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That proposition highlights the trade-off faced by the policy-maker in designing an
optimal communication mechanism. On the one-hand, the principal would like to learn
the true ideal point θ of the interest group to implement his own most preferred policy
q∗(θ) = θ + δ. However, this choice is not incentive compatible from (4). If the principal
wants to follow a flexible type-dependent policy, it has to be necessarily the interest
group’s ideal point and thus q(θ) = θ. This latter policy differs from the policy-maker’s
own ideal point by an amount δ and is thus “too” low compared to q∗(θ). Instead, the
principal might want to avoid any communication and implement a more rigid policy.
This policy entails much pooling but is closer on average of his own ex ante optimal
policy.
The key insight provided by Proposition 2 is that the principal always benefits from
some communication on the upper tail of the types distribution whereas pooling is instead
preferred on the lower tail. The intuition behind this result is the following. First, we know
that a continuous mechanism has at most one interval where effective communication takes
place between the principal and the agent (see (5)). Clearly, having a pooling mechanism
on an upper tail θ ≥ θˆ2 cannot be optimal. Indeed, the principal can offer an incentive
scheme with effective communication inducing a policy q(θ) = θ for θ ≥ θˆ2 which is closer
to his own ideal point q∗(θ) = θ + δ than any pooling scheme q(θ) = θˆ2 when θ is large
enough. Hence, communication is valuable on the upper tail.
Second, consider now the lower tail of the type distribution. The policy-maker prefers
to offer a pooling policy on such an interval. The cost of doing so is of course that the
policy is not responsive to the preference parameter θ. The benefit is that, for the highest
values of θ on that interval, this pooling policy is closer on average to the principal’s ideal
point. The benefits of having a near-by policy for these intermediate values may exceed
the cost borne on the very lowest values with a pooling scheme even though this pooling
may be quite further away from the principal’s ideal policy. This is so when relatively
little weight is left to that lower tail. Log-concavity ensures this latter property.
Proposition 1 highlights a fundamental trade-off between rigidity on the lower tail
and flexibility on the upper tail of the types distribution. The cut-off value θˆ summarizes
how those two forces compensate each other. The alternative expression in (7) reinforces
our understanding of this trade-off. On the lower tail, the principal chooses a policy
δ +Ef (θ|θ ≤ θˆ) whereas on the upper tail, the interest group is residual claimant for the
policy which fits his own preferences. The cut-off is determined by making the principal
indifferent between these two options.
Corollary 1 : Assume that the conditions of Proposition 1 hold and that the conflict of
interests between the principal and the agent is large enough, i.e., δ ≥ ∫ θ¯
θ
F (θ)dθ then
there is no communication at the optimal mechanism. When δ <
∫ θ¯
θ
F (θ)dθ, there is
11
always some partial communication.
It is striking to see that a similar upper bound on the level of conflict is needed to
ensure no-communication in the signaling environment where the interest group moves
first.20 Large conflicts of interest destroy any possibility for communicating preferences in
an incentive compatible way even when the principal recovers some commitment power in
the mechanism design environment. In the sequel, we will focus on levels of the conflict
of interests small enough to still justify some communication even if it is quite partial.
Coming back to our examples where continuity of the optimal mechanism is ensured,
we can easily compute the values of the cut-off θˆ:
Example 1 (continued):
δ =
1
θˆ − θ
∫ θˆ
θ
(θ − θ)dθ = θˆ − θ
2
,
so that communication never takes place when δ > ∆θ
2
.
Of course, the continuity of the optimal mechanism is not ensured for any distribution.
For normal distributions, discontinuities appear when δ is not too large. Condition (6)
is indeed harder to satisfy when distributions put enough mass on a hump. This loss of
tractability will force us to limit the scope of our comparison between a coalition and
separated groups in some of the Propositions below by specifying distributions and/or
conditions on δ ensuring continuity.
Next proposition gives more conditions to justify the focus on continuous schemes.
Proposition 2 : Take any single-peaked, symmetric and log-concave cumulative distri-
bution F (·), the optimal mechanism is continuous if the optimal continuous mechanism
q(θ) = max{θ, θˆ}
with δ = 1
F (θˆ)
∫ θˆ
θ
F (θ)dθ is such that θˆ ≥ Ef (θ).21
This proposition is extremely useful to check continuity without having to deal directly
with condition (6). Take for instance the case of a normal distribution with zero mean
From Proposition 2, it is enough to find δ so that θˆ > 0 to make sure that the optimal
mechanism with this distribution is continuous.
20See Grossman and Helpman (2001, Section 4.1.4) for instance.
21For distributions with unbounded support, we need in addition the technical assumption that
limx→−∞
∫ x
−∞ θ
2dF (θ) = 0.
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3.3 Comparative Statics
3.3.1 Conflict of Interests
In this subsection, we analyze how the policy-maker and the interest group’s expected
utility vary with the degree of conflict δ.
First, note that the expected utilities of the policy-maker and the interest group can
be written respectively as
V (δ) = −1
2
[∫ θˆ(δ)
θ
(θˆ(δ)− θ − δ)2f(θ)dθ + δ2(1− F (θˆ(δ)))
]
and
U(δ) = −1
2
∫ θˆ(δ)
θ
(θˆ(δ)− θ)2f(θ)dθ
where θˆ(δ) is defined implicitly from (7).
Proposition 3 : Assume that the optimal mechanism is continuous, then the following
properties hold:
• There is less communication as the degree of conflict increases (θˆ(δ) increases with
δ) when F (·) is log-concave.
• Both the principal and the agent’s expected utilities decrease with the degree of con-
flict (V˙ (δ) < 0, U˙(δ) < 0).
The intuition behind these results is straightforward. As the conflict of interests
between the policy-maker and the interest group is more pronounced, communication is
less attractive to the principal who prefers a rigid policy for a greater set of values of the
preference parameter.
Of course, enlarging that pooling region hurts the interest group who prefers a flexible
policy since the latter fits his own ideal point. Moreover, more conflict hurts also the
principal because it increases the wedge between his ideal point and that of the interest
group over the range of values of θ where communication indeed takes place.
3.3.2 Informativeness of the Distribution
Let us now keep the bias δ as fixed and consider some comparative statics with respect
to the informativeness of the distribution.
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For simplicity, we will now assume that f(·) is distributed on the whole real line,
centered at zero so that Ef (θ) =
∫ +∞
−∞ θf(θ)dθ = 0 and Varf (θ) =
∫ +∞
−∞ θ
2f(θ)dθ < +∞.
Consider now the distribution G(θ, σ) with density g(θ, σ) = σf(σθ) where σ is a
positive parameter. It is clear that
Eg(θ) =
∫ +∞
−∞
σθf(σθ)dθ = 0
and
Varg(θ) =
∫ +∞
−∞
σθ2f(σθ)dθ =
1
σ2
∫ +∞
−∞
u2f(u)du =
Varf (θ)
σ2
.
An increase in σ means an increase in the informativeness of the distribution since G(·)
second-order stochastically dominates F (·) by sweeping more weight around the same
mean Ef (θ) = Eg(θ) = 0.
As a benchmark, note that a policy-maker who never communicates with the interest
group would choose a rigid policy qp = δ but his expected payoff would always obviously
be greater when the distribution of types is more centered around its mean.
Let us turn to the case where communication is possible. We define now the principal’s
expected welfare V (σ) as a function of the parameter σ:
V (σ) = −1
2
[∫ θˆ(σ)
−∞
(θˆ(σ)− θ − δ)2g(θ, σ)dθ + δ2(1−G(θˆ(σ), σ))
]
where the optimal cut-off θˆ(σ) is defined implicitly by:
δ =
1
G(θˆ(σ), σ)
∫ θˆ(σ)
−∞
G(θ, σ)dθ =
1
σF (σθˆ(σ))
∫ σθˆ(σ)
−∞
F (θ)dθ. (8)
If we denote θ˜(1, δ) the solution to (8) when σ = 1, we observe that θˆ(σ) = 1
σ
θ˜(1, δσ).
From (8), we obtain after integrating by parts
δσ = θ˜(1, δσ)− 1
F (θ˜(1, δσ))
∫ θ˜(1,δσ)
−∞
θf(θ)dθ
and thus
δσ ∼
σ→∞
θ˜(1, δσ) so that θˆ(σ) −→
σ→∞
δ.
This first result shows that, as the distribution on the interest group’s ideal point
becomes more informative, the principal chooses a policy which comes closer to what he
would do with a rigid policy based on no communication at all. Indeed, such policy is
almost first-best when the distribution puts increasingly more weight around the mean.
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Proposition 4 : The principal’s expected payoff increases with the informativeness of
the distribution: V˙ (σ) > 0. The interest group’s expected payoff decreases with the infor-
mativeness of the distribution: U˙(σ) < 0.
This result is of a particular importance since it gives us some insights on why a policy-
maker might want to face “larger” groups to facilitate communication. The logic behind
this proposition is straightforward. As the distribution of the ideal point θ becomes more
centered around the mean, the principal does not really care about the policy out of
this particular value and communication has less value for him than in the case of a less
informative distribution. Relying on the interest group’s report is of a lesser importance.
Example 3: Assume that θ ∼ N(0, 1
σ2
). Then, as σ converges towards infinity, the
distribution converges towards a Dirac at zero and the principal’s expected payoff with
a continuous mechanism increases. We will give below some condition ensuring that the
optimal mechanism with such a normal distribution is indeed continuous.
4 Coalition
The previous section has shown the nature of the transaction costs associated to asym-
metric information between an interest group and the policy-maker. Communication is
needed for distributions which are not too informative on the preferences of the interest
group but the cost of this communication is that policies depart from the principal’s ideal
point. In this section, we are interested in the properties of those transaction costs when
groups coalesce.
Let us now consider two groups with preference parameters θ1 and θ2 respectively.
Those parameters are identically and independently distributed in the same distribution
F (·) with density f(·). Those two groups merge as one by credibly sharing their informa-
tion on preferences and have an equal bargaining weight of one half in the coalition. We
follow the social choice literature in skipping the issue of how information sharing within
a coalition is incentive compatible.22 That interest groups share credibly information in
a coalition has been documented in the political science literature. Laumann and Knoke
(1987) and Heinz and al. (1990) examine information exchanges between group dyads as
a key to intergroup coordination. Hula (1999, Chapter 4) reported that interest groups
are linked by the career path of their staff members and that a phenomenon akin to
the “revolving door” takes place between groups. This phenomenon certainly facilitates
information flows between distinct organizations.
22This is a standard assumption going back to at least Green and Laffont (1979).
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The utility of the merged group can thus be written as:
UM(q, θ1, θ2) = −1
2
[
1
2
(q − θ1)2 + 1
2
(q − θ2)2
]
= −1
2
(
q − θ1 + θ2
2
)2
− (θ2 − θ1)
2
8
. (9)
Up to some terms which are independent from the policy chosen and thus cannot be
screened by the policy-maker, the utility of that coalition only depends on the average
ideal point between group members.
The game of communication between that merged group and the uninformed policy-
maker is thus similar to that we solved in Section 3. The only difference comes now from
the fact that the initial distribution of types F (·) is replaced by the distribution G(·) of
the “average” between two independent draws of the initial distribution. Of course, G(·)
is more informative than F (·) since it shifts more weight around the same mean. The
logic behind Proposition 4 should again apply and that increase in the informativeness
of the distribution should definitively improve the principal’s expected payoff. Below, we
show this result for two examples of distribution.
4.1 Uniform Distribution
Consider a uniform distribution on [0, 1]. From Lemma 2, we know that the optimal
mechanism for a single group is necessarily continuous and that the cut-off θˆf between
the pooling and separating regions satisfies θˆf = 2δ.
23
Consider now the average between two independent draws θ1+θ2
2
. It has a density g(·)
given by:
g(θ) =
{
4θ if 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1
2
4− 4θ if 1 ≥ θ ≥ 1
2
.
The optimal continuous mechanism for such a distribution gives a cut-off satisfying
(7) which can also be written as:∫ θˆg
0
(θˆg − θ − δ)g(θ)dθ = 0.
For δ ≤ 1
6
, the solution is θˆg = 3δ > θˆf meaning that the pooling region increases for
small conflicts of interests. For δ ≥ 1
6
, the cut-off θˆg is determined by
(θˆg − δ)(12θˆ2g − 24θˆg + 6) + 12θˆ2g − 8θˆ3g − 1 = 0. (10)
23Remember that partial communication takes only place if 2δ ≤ 1.
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The solution θˆg(δ) of (10) is increasing in the size of the conflict of interests δ and it is
also concave in δ. Moreover, θˆf (δ) = 2δ is such that the left-hand side of (10) is negative
so that θˆg(δ) > θˆf (δ) = 2δ.
We summarize these findings as:
Proposition 5 : Assume that the ideal points θi (i = 1, 2) are uniformly and indepen-
dently distributed on [0, 1].
• The policy-maker uses an optimal mechanism which is continuous with a coalition .
It entails less communication than what occurs with each individual interest group
taken separately.
• The principal’s expected payoff when dealing with a coalition is greater than what he
obtains with a single interest group for any δ in
[
4
27
, 1
2
]
. For δ ∈ [0, 4
27
], the principal
is better off when dealing with a single interest group.
• Each interest group loses from merging compared with the case where he deals alone
with the policy-maker whatever δ.
When dealing with a coalition, the principal benefits from more precise information.
As in Proposition 4, a more precise signal makes it less necessary to rely on communication
and a rigid policy over a greater pooling region performs relatively well. This pooling,
of course, hurts the interest groups since the implemented policy does not fit their own
preferences. Interest groups benefit from more screening since then the policy is better
aligned with their ideal points. They always prefer being alone to communicate with the
principal.
For small values of δ, the most important thing is the range of values of θ where there
is indeed communication since communication gets easier. Indeed, the principal and the
interest groups’ ideal points are close to each other and, since θˆg > θˆf , there is too much
pooling with a coalition. In other words, the density g (θ) being not “too concentrated”
around the mean, the gains from communicating to the right of cut-off value θˆg are less
with the density g(·) than with the uniform density f(·). Technically, the relative gains
from communicating with a coalition depend on a term δ
2
2
G
(
θˆg
)
= 9δ4 which is of order
four in δ. At the same time these gains with a single group are represented by a term
δ2
2
F
(
θˆf
)
= δ3 which is only of order three. For a small δ, the single-agent structure
certainly dominates.
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4.2 Normal Distribution
Normal distributions are interesting because they provide an example of a closed class
such that the average θ1+θ2
2
is still normally distributed N(0, 1
2σ2
) with the same mean
and half the variance when the θi’s are normally distributed N(0,
1
σ2
).
To make easier the comparison between individual lobbying and the coalition, we
impose in the next proposition a condition on the variance which ensures continuity of
the optimal mechanism. Continuity is ensured when the conflict of interests is large
enough compared with the variance of the distribution. Improving the informativeness of
the distribution by increasing σ increases the cut-off θˆ(σ) since communication is then less
valuable to the principal as he gets a more precise idea of the interest groups’ preferences.
Under these conditions we can now prove
Proposition 6 : Assume that the interest groups’ ideal points θi (i = 1, 2) are normally
and independently distributed (θi ∼ N(0, 1σ2 )) and that δσ >
√
2
pi
, then, the following
holds:
• The policy-maker uses a continuous mechanism with a merged group. There is less
communication than what occurs with each individual interest group.
• The principal’s expected payoff from dealing with a coalition is greater than what he
obtains with a single interest group.
• Each interest group loses from merging compared with the case where he stands alone
with the policy-maker.
Propositions 5 and 6 altogether show the basic tension that drives the formation of
large interest groups. On the one hand, by dealing with a coalition, the policy-maker gets
a more precise information on preferences and communication becomes less necessary.
On the other hand, individual interest groups may be reluctant to form such a coalition
because their respective ideal points are never chosen as communication is less necessary
and, when it takes place, this is only an aggregate of the preferences of both groups which
ends up being used by the principal.
To sharpen intuition, let consider the case of n groups merging as one. Using (7) in
the case of a normal distribution we get, after integrating by parts, the simple expression
of the cut-off θˆ(n)
δ = θˆ(n) +
1
nσ2
f(θˆ(n), n)
F (θˆ(n), n)
, (11)
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where F (θ, n) =
√
nσ2
2pi
∫ θ
−∞ e
−nσ2x2
2 dx is the cumulative distribution function for the law
N
(
0, 1
nσ2
)
of the average
∑n
i=1 θi
n
. It is easy to check on (11) that θˆ(n) converges towards
δ as n gets large. The rigid policy qp = δ is thus almost the optimal mechanism offered
by the policy-maker.
An alternative interpretation of this result is worth to be stressed. As n increases,
the ideal point of each individual group becomes less relevant for the chosen policy. The
individual incentives to lie of each individual interest group get pooled altogether in a
coalition and the collective incentives to lie are weak. Indeed, by the Law of Large
Numbers, uncertainty on the average type
∑n
i=1 θi
n
is washed out in the aggregate. Because
a larger group better communicates a piece of information which is known for sure by
the policy-maker, the incentive problem is easier to solve. Having a grand-coalition of
interest groups allows to benefit from some economies of scope in the transaction costs
associated to asymmetric information. Those economies of scope take a spectacular form
with a large number of interest groups.24
5 Coalition versus Multiple Interest Groups
In the previous section, we limited ourselves to comparing what happens if the principal
deals with a coalition of interest groups and what happens if he deals with each of them
separately. In this section, we undertake a less biased comparison by considering the case
where the policy-maker deals simultaneously with both groups.
To model the groups’ non-cooperative behavior, we use dominant strategy as the rel-
evant implementation concept. Although Bayesian implementation would relax incentive
constraints, dominant strategy implementation is amenable to a more direct comparison
with the case on a single interest group.25 Another motivation for this implementation
concept is that it is less sensitive to the beliefs that interest groups may have on each
other. This seems an attractive property in a constitutional perspective which would
insist on finding mechanisms and organizations of the lobbying activity which are robust
to those details of the environments. Finally, focusing on dominant strategy is already
enough to obtain the result that dealing separately with the different groups may improve
on the outcome achieved with a coalition.
24In a signaling models, Lohman (1993, 1994) showed that agents may still have an incentives to
signal their types even though they are informationally small. The mechanism design approach that we
use in this paper shows that dealing with a single large coalition weakens indeed the cost of credible
communication.
25It is well known from Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1992) that dominant strategy entails no loss
compared to Bayesian implementation in some models with monetary transfers and quasi-linearity. This
equivalence of course fails in our context without monetary transfer.
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With dominant strategy, incentive compatibility for interest group i can be written as
−1
2
(q(θi, θ−i)− θi)2 ≥ −1
2
(q(θˆi, θ−i)− θi)2, ∀i = 1, 2, (θi, θˆi, θ−i) ∈ Θ3.
Proceeding with the same differentiable approach as in Section 3,26 we can easily prove
that q(·) is monotonically increasing in each of its arguments and thus almost everywhere
differentiable in (θ1, θ2). At any point of differentiability, incentive constraints can be
written as:
∂q
∂θi
(θi, θ−i)(q(θi, θ−i)− θi) = 0, for i = 1, 2, (θi, θ−i) ∈ Θ2. (12)
Hence, q(·) is either constant along θi or equal to the ideal point of group i and thus
independent on θ−i. This leads to the following characterization of dominant strategy
continuous schemes.
Lemma 3 : For any symmetric dominant strategy and continuous mechanism q(·), there
exist cut-offs θ∗, θ∗∗ and θ∗∗∗ such that θ∗ ≤ θ∗∗ ≤ θ∗∗∗ and :
q(θ) = min{θ∗∗∗,max{θ1, θ∗∗},max{θ2, θ∗∗},max{θ1, θ2, θ∗}}. (13)
These continuous mechanisms generalize those found with a single interest groups.
Indeed, along each argument θi, the trace of the mechanism q(θi, ·) looks like a one-
dimensional continuous mechanism. Again, we recover with our differentiable approach
the minmax mechanisms of Moulin (1980), now in a two-agent framework.
Those dominant strategy mechanisms can be given an interesting interpretation. For
the region where the policy is flexible, the ideal point of either of the interest groups is
implemented by the policy process. Everything happens as if this group becomes then
residual claimant for the policy.
Generally, it is hard to find out the optimal cut-offs for any distribution of types. We
will contend ourselves with analyzing explicitly the case of a uniform distribution on [0, 1]
and will give numerical simulations for the case of a normal distribution.
26See Laffont and Maskin (1980) for the differentiable approach of dominant strategy mechanisms in
settings with monetary transfers.
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5.1 Uniform Distribution
Of particular importance in the analysis below are the following mechanisms:27
q(θ1, θ2) =

θ∗ if max(θ1, θ2) ≤ θ∗
max(θ1, θ2) if θ
∗ ≤ max(θ1, θ2) ≤ θ∗∗
θ∗∗ if min (θ1, θ2) ≤ θ∗∗,max(θ1, θ2) ≥ θ∗∗
min (θ1, θ2) if θ
∗∗ ≤ min (θ1, θ2)
(14)
Those schemes implement thus a policy which fits with the highest ideal point of the
interest groups when there is screening in the intermediate region and with the smallest
ideal point when there is screening in the upper-right corner of the square [0, 1]× [0, 1].
Denoting then by V (θ∗, θ∗∗) the principal’s expected payoff with such a dominant
strategy continuous scheme, we have, using symmetry and the uniform distribution:
V (θ∗, θ∗∗) = −
∫ θ∗
0
(∫ θ1
0
(
θ∗ − θ1 + θ2
2
− δ
)2
dθ2
)
dθ1
−
∫ θ∗∗
θ∗
(∫ θ1
0
(
θ1 − θ1 + θ2
2
− δ
)2
dθ2
)
dθ1
−
∫ 1
θ∗∗
(∫ θ∗∗
0
(
θ∗∗ − θ1 + θ2
2
− δ
)2
dθ2
)
dθ1
+
∫ 1
θ∗∗
(∫ θ1
θ∗∗
(
θ2 − θ1 + θ2
2
− δ
)2
dθ2
)
dθ1
Optimizing with respect to θ∗ and θ∗∗ we obtain
θ∗(δ) = 2δ and θ∗∗(δ) =
1
2
+ 2δ, (15)
and θ∗∗(δ) < 1 if and only if δ ≤ 1
4
. For 1
2
≥ δ ≥ 1
4
, the scheme has only one cut-off
θ∗(δ) = 2δ.
We are now ready to state the main result of this section.
Proposition 7 : Assume that θ1 and θ2 are independently and uniformly distributed on
[0, 1]. Then, the optimal mechanism with a coalition is continuous. Moreover, there exist
two critical levels of the conflict of interests δ∗ and δ∗∗ such that δ∗∗ > δ∗ and the following
ranking holds:
• When δ < δ∗ (resp. δ ≥ δ∗), the policy-maker is better (resp. worse) off with a
coalition than with separated groups.
27It will be shown in Appendix that these mechanisms are in fact optimal ones.
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• When δ < δ∗∗ (resp. δ ≥ δ∗∗), interest groups are better (resp. worse) off if they
merge than if they remain separated.
The main idea of the proof is to compare the optimal mechanism with a merged group
with a dominant strategy mechanism of type (14) dealing with both groups. To do that,
the following figure is useful.
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Figure 1: Comparing dominant strategy mechanisms
and a coalition. The case δ > 1
6
.
Decision-Maker: On Figure 1, we have drawn the line θ1+θ2
2
= θˆg > 2δ which separates
the areas A+B where a coalition of both groups receives a rigid policy from the area C
where the ideal policy of this coalition is chosen. On C, isopolicy lines are 450 downward
slopping lines which thus correspond to none of the ideal points of either group except on
the measure zero set of events where both groups have the same preferences.
Consider now the dominant strategy mechanism of type (14) having a cut-off θ∗ =
θˆg(δ). On area A, this mechanism is pooling and yields to the principal the same expected
payoff as the mechanism given to a coalition since the rigid policy chosen is the same in
both cases.
On area B, dealing separately with each group allows to make a policy contingent
on the preferences of the group who has the highest ideal point. Screening although
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imperfect and biased in one direction is possible whereas dealing with a coalition still
entails a rigid policy. This screening effect captures the benefits of keeping groups split
apart. When the interest group’s preferences are sufficiently apart one from the other,
the dominant strategy mechanism elicits the preferences of the group with the highest
ideal point whereas communicating with a coalition does not allow this. To understand
this effect, it is useful to come back on the comparative statics made in Section 3.3.1. We
showed there that the optimal policy with a single group requires more communication
as the conflict of interests between this group and the policy-maker is less pronounced.
With multiple interest groups, the same logic applies. The “virtual conflict of interests”
between group 1 and the policy-maker depends now on the realized preferences of group
2 and will typically be equal to
δ′ = δ +
θ1 + θ2
2
− θ1 = δ − (θ1 − θ2)
2
.
This virtual conflict is a decreasing function of the “distance” between the ideal points
of both groups. As the distance between the groups’ ideal points increases, the principal’s
preferences are more aligned with the group having the highest ideal point given that δ is
large enough to ensure that the virtual conflict of interests remain positive. Everything
happens as if an endogenous bias towards that group appears. Instead, the mechanism
dealing with a coalition smooths out this discrepancy between preferences and is thus
unable to account for this endogenous bias.
On area C, dealing with a coalition allows a more efficient communication with the
principal since only the statistics θ1+θ2
2
is relevant for decision-making and isopolicy lines
cannot depend on this statistics with dominant strategy. However, since the density
of θ1+θ2
2
decreases over
[
θˆg(δ), 1
]
, this potential benefit of a coalition is not big enough
to offset the cost of an excessive bunching when the interest groups’ preferences are
sufficiently far apart.
To give further intuition on the benefits of a decentralized mechanism it is useful
to think about the case of a sufficiently large conflict of interests. Typically, we will set
δ = 1
2
−ε for ε small enough so that, with a coalition, θˆg(δ) is close to 1 and there is almost
no communication with a coalition. The screening area C is then a small triangle having
an area of order ε2. The gain of communicating with a coalition with respect to full pooling
everywhere is thus of order ε2. Instead, by dealing separately with each interesting group
with a dominant strategy mechanism, the principal can screen preferences on areas B+C
and obtains a gain of communicating of ε everywhere. This dimensionality argument
underscores the benefits of a dominant strategy mechanism at least for large conflicts of
interests.
For small values of the conflict of interests, the 450 degree line θ1+θ2
2
= θˆg lies on the
very south-west of the [0, 1] × [0, 1] square. There is communication almost everywhere
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with a coalition and the communicated statistics perfectly fits what is needed by the
principal for deciding which policy to implement. Clearly, dealing with a merger dominates
in that case. In the extreme case where δ is close to zero and thus there is almost no
pooling, using a decentralized mechanism is clearly suboptimal whatever the values of the
cut-offs θ∗, θ∗∗ and θ∗∗∗. Indeed, such mechanisms have isopolicy lines which are never
aligned with those of the principal contrary to what happens with a coalition.
Interest Groups: Proposition 7 shows that interest groups also gain from being split
apart for sufficiently large δ. Indeed, when they remain separated, there is a positive
likelihood that the principal’s policy is exactly the ideal points of each of those groups.
This beneficial force is strong enough to dominate the cost of having the preferences of
the other group being exactly implemented sometimes. Instead, the more average policy
that would be chosen with a coalition never fits the ideal points of either group except,
with probability zero, when these ideal points are the same and above θˆg(δ).
Our model suggests therefore that the multiplication of interest groups found in prac-
tice may find its logic in the fact that each of these groups is, over some range of preferences
profiles, residual claimant for the decision made. A coalition of interest groups does not
reflect as easily individual preferences.
5.2 Normal Distribution
That case is significantly less tractable than the case of a uniform distribution. We will
content ourselves with giving a few numerical examples showing the generality of the
insights gleaned in Section 5.1.
Below we present the values of the payoffs of the principals in both settings (coalition
and decentralization) for the mechanisms described on Figure 1. We denote by δ+M the
limiting value of the bias where the solution of the equation (8) is positive which guarantees
from Proposition 2 that the optimal mechanism for a coalition is continuous. Since the
average of normal distributions with variance 1
σ2
has the variance 1
2σ2
, we can see from
Lemma 4 in the Appendix that δ+M =
1
σ
2
√
1
pi
Then, for σ = 1 we have δ+M = 0.56. The
next table summarizes, for various values of δ, the optimal cut-off with a coalition and
the principal’s payoff VM and VD under either a coalition or a decentralized organization
with θ∗ = θM(δ).
δ θ̂M (δ) VM VD Result
δ+M = 0.56 0 −0.125 −0.104 Decentralized
0.75 0.43 −0.170 −0.121 Decentralized
1 0.84 −0.210 −0.152 Decentralized
2 1.995 −0.249 −0.233 Decentralized
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For δ ≥ 2, the difference between the two organizational modes becomes negligibly
small. The difference VD(δ)−VM(δ) is increasing and then decreasing but remains always
positive. So, the decentralized case overperforms the merged case. Similar calculations
show the same result for different values of σ. We have to point out that for small values
of σ the difference between the payoffs that the principal obtains in both cases becomes
very small, still the principal prefers decentralization for δ > δ+M . Further simulations
show that, for δ < δ+M , the coalition is preferred by the policy-maker, exactly as in the
uniform case and the intuition is the same.28
Let us turn to the interest groups. To compare their payoffs under both organizational
forms, we have now to consider the optimal mechanisms in both cases.29 It is clear that
the limiting value δ+D for which the optimal decentralized mechanism is necessarily con-
tinuous is bigger than the corresponding value δ+M . Therefore, to ensure that the optimal
mechanisms in both cases are continuous we have to take values of δ starting at δ+D. The
following Table shows that for σ = 1 the decentralized scheme is preferable from the
groups’ point of view. Interests groups are aligned with the principal and prefer a more
decentralized organization of the lobbying activity.
δ θ̂M (δ) θ
∗, θ∗∗ UM UD Result
δ+D = 0.798 0.51 0, 1.95 −0.596 −0.514 Decentralized
1 0.84 0.48, 2.33 −0.840 −0.697 Decentralized
2 1.995 1.93, 4.20 −2.489 −2.382 Decentralized
6 Conclusion
In this paper,we have proposed a mechanism design approach useful to analyze the de-
terminants of group formation in an environment where interest groups communicate
information which is relevant for optimal policy-making.
We have first characterized the optimal mechanism and communication pattern in a
framework with only one interest group. More communication takes place as the con-
flict between the interest group and the decision-maker is less pronounced and as the
distribution of the interest group’s preference parameter becomes less informative.
This last point shows that a policy-maker could have strong incentives to facilitate
the formation of large coalition of interest groups. Indeed, the “average” ideal points
of such coalitions are better known and communication becomes less of an issue. This
28This result is obtained by considering the optimal continuous mechanism with a coalition. We do
not need to prove it for the optimal mechanism.
29For a normal distribution, the optimal mechanism in a decentralized case within class (14) has two
kinks at θ∗ and θ∗∗.
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information effect is however not enough in itself to explain alone the organization of
lobbies. A coalition of interest groups, although it transmits a more precise information
to the decision-maker, is unable to account for the possible large discrepancies in the
preferences of the colluding interest groups. The policy-maker and the interest groups
as well may sometimes prefer a more decentralized way of communication information
where each interest group is approached separately. Communication is then easier, more
specifically when the interest groups preferences are sufficiently far apart and the conflict
of interests with the principal significant. A playing field where several competing interest
groups independently communicate with the decision-maker emerges. Our model based on
the precise analysis of the transaction costs due to asymmetric information in lobbying
games offers thus a justification for the coexistence of multiple interest groups on the
policy arena.
Of course, those results are partial and sometimes obtained by making restrictive
assumptions on distributions of preference parameters. A more thorough analysis which
would generalize our findings to other distributions is called for but is likely to face
strong technical difficulties coming from the fact that optimal mechanisms cannot be
easily characterized and compared without specifying those distributions.
An alternative path would be to relax incentive constraints and the constraints on
communication by allowing monetary transfers between the policy-maker and the interest
groups. Although, those transfers can be motivated in practice,30 such an extension of
the model might lead to qualitatively different insights.31
It would also be worth to generalize our analysis to the cases where interest groups
have different biases and to other information structures involving for instance correlation
between the various interest groups’ ideal points.
Finally, the organization of lobbying which emerges in our model depends of course
of the decision-maker’s objective function. Here, we have assumed that this principal is
somewhat a social welfare maximizer, ideally choosing an average between the interest
groups’ ideal points and that of the general public. That decision-maker could follow
another objective, for instance, in a political contest environment, he would certainly
prefer to choose a policy corresponding to the median of the public and the interest
groups’ ideal points. The whole pattern of communication and transaction costs would
be modified accordingly leading potentially to an interesting feed-back on the incentives
of groups to coalesce or not.
We hope to investigate some of these issues in future research.
30They may for instance stand for bribes, campaign contributions, or even official redistributive policies.
31For instance, in the I.O. literature, Baron and Besanko (1992), Gilbert and Riordan (1995), Dana
(1993), and others have found conditions under which dealing with a coalition of suppliers Pareto domi-
nates decentralized mechanisms in a context where agents have quasi-linear utility functions.
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Appendix
• Proof of Lemma 1: From standard revealed preferences arguments, we have indeed
for any (θ, θˆ) ∈ Θ2 such that θ > θˆ:
−1
2
(q(θ)− θ)2 ≥ −1
2
(q(θˆ)− θ)2
and
−1
2
(q(θˆ)− θˆ)2 ≥ −1
2
(q(θ)− θˆ)2.
Summing those two constraints yields
(θ − θˆ)(q(θ)− q(θˆ)) ≥ 0.
Therefore, q(·) is weakly increasing and thus almost everywhere differentiable.
At any point of differentiability, we must have (4) and thus q(θ) is either flat or
q(θ) = θ, i.e., corresponds to the most-preferred choice of the lobbying group.
If q(·) is discontinuous at θ1, q(θ+1 ) 6= q(θ−1 ), but type θ1 must be indifferent between
choosing the policies which are respectively on the left and on the right of θ1
−1
2
(q(θ−1 )− θ1)2 = −
1
2
(q(θ1)− θ1)2 = −1
2
(q(θ+1 )− θ1)2. (A1)
Using the right- and left-hand sides, we then get (3).
Because q(θ+1 ) 6= q(θ−1 ) at a discontinuity and q(·) is differentiable on both sides, it
cannot be that q(θ1) is not flat on those sides.
Finally, (A1) shows that either q(θ1) = q(θ
+
1 ) or q(θ1) = q(θ
−
1 ).
• Proof of Lemma 2: Suppose to the contrary that the optimal mechanism q(θ) is
discontinuous. Then using the structure of incentive compatible mechanisms given in
Lemma 1, there exists an interval [θ1, θ2] ⊆ [θ, θ¯] such that on this interval:
q(θ) =
{
θ1 if θ < θˆ
2θˆ − θ1 if θ > θˆ
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where θˆ = θ1+θ2
2
. We can consider the new mechanism q(θ, θ˜), which differs from q(θ) only
in [θ1, θ2], and which is parameterized by θ˜ ∈ [θ1, θˆ]:
q(θ, θ˜) =

θ if θ ∈ [θ1, θ˜)
θ˜ if θ ∈ [θ˜, θˆ]
2θˆ − θ˜ if θ ∈ (θˆ, 2θˆ − θ˜]
θ if θ ∈ [2θˆ − θ˜, 2θˆ − θ1].
This new mechanism preserves incentive compatibility. The derivative of the utility
of the principal on this interval with respect to θ˜ under condition (6) is positive, which
contradicts the optimality of q(θ).
• Proof of Proposition 1: Note that the principal’s expected payoff with a continuous
scheme characterized by the cut-offs θˆ1 and θˆ2 can be written as
V (θˆ1, θˆ2) = −1
2
{∫ θˆ1
θ
(θˆ1 − θ − δ)2f(θ)dθ + δ2
∫ θˆ2
θˆ1
f(θ)dθ +
∫ θ¯
θˆ2
(θˆ2 − θ − δ)2f(θ)dθ
}
.
Optimizing with respect to θˆ2 with the constraint θˆ2 ≥ θˆ1 yields
∂V
∂θˆ2
(θˆ1, θˆ2) = −
∫ θ¯
θˆ2
(θˆ2 − θ − δ)f(θ)dθ < 0
so that θˆ2 = θˆ1 and we can rewrite V (·) as a function of θˆ1 only. Abusing notations, we
have:
V (θˆ1) = −1
2
{∫ θˆ1
θ
(θˆ1 − θ − δ)2f(θ)dθ + δ2(1− F (θˆ1))
}
.
The first-order condition d
dθˆ1
V (θˆ) = 0 yields the expression of θˆ given by (7).
Moreover, we have
d2
dθˆ1
V (θˆ1) = δf(θˆ1)− F (θˆ1)
and thus the second-order condition
d2
dθˆ1
V (θˆ1)
∣∣∣∣
θˆ1=θˆ
= δf(θˆ)− F (θˆ) ≤ 0
is satisfied if and only if
f(θˆ)
F 2(θˆ)
∫ θˆ
θ
F (θ)dθ ≤ 1. (A2)
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However, consider the function ϕ(θ) = 1
F (θ)
∫ θ
θ
F (x)dx. We have
d
dθ
(ϕ(θ)) = 1− f(θ)
F 2(θ)
∫ θ
θ
F (x)dx = 1− f(θ)
F (θ)
ϕ(θ).
But when F (·) is log-concave, d
dθ
(
F (θ)
f(θ)
)
> 0 and
ϕ(θ) =
1
F (θ)
∫ θ
θ
F (x)
f(x)
f(x)dx ≤ F (θ)
f(θ)
,
so that d
dθ
(ϕ(θ)) ≥ 0. Finally, (A2) holds.
• Proof of Corollary 1: Since ϕ(θ) is increasing, θˆ ≤ θ¯ if and only if δ ≤ ∫ θ¯
θ
F (θ)dθ.
• Proof of Proposition 2:
The case of finite support with a finite number of discontinuities.
a) Suppose that the optimal mechanism q (·) has n jumps at points a1 > a2 > · · · > an.
First we establish that in (θ, θˆ) there are no interval where the mechanism coincides with
the agent’s ideal point q (θ) = θ. Since the support of the distribution is finite we can
consider the first interval from the left (x2, x1) where the optimal mechanism is separating.
Then in the interval (θ, x1) the mechanism has a form:
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q (θ) =
{
x2 if θ < x2
θ if x2 < θ < x1.
Consider the mechanism qε (θ) which is the same as q (θ) except on the interval (θ, x2)
where it is equal to
qε (θ) =
{
x2 + ε if θ < x2 + ε
θ if x2 + ε < θ < x1.
If we differentiate the principal’s expected payoff achieved with the mechanism qε (θ)
with respect to ε we have:
V ′ (qε (θ)) = δF (x2 + ε)−
∫ x2+ε
θ
F (θ) dθ > 0.
The inequality follows from (8) and x2 + ε < θˆ.
33 Therefore we can always improve
the mechanism q (θ). A contradiction with optimality.
32We do not take into account the values of the mechanism on the borders of intervals since this is a
set of measure zero.
33It is easy to see that the case x2 + ε > θˆ is impossible if there is at least one discontinuity.
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b) It is easy to see that in the decreasing part of the support
(
Ef (θ) , θ¯
)
there might
be only one point of discontinuity, namely a1. Summarizing we can conclude that, for the
optimal mechanism, we must have
q (θ) =

xn+1 if θ ∈
(
θ, xn+1+xn
2
)
xi if θ ∈
(xi+xi+1
2
, xi−1+xi
2
)
, n ≥ i ≥ 2
x1 if θ ∈
(
x1+x2
2
, x1
)
θ if θ ∈ (x1, θ¯) .
(A3)
The mechanism has jumps at points ai =
xi+xi+1
2
and a2 =
x2+x3
2
≤ θˆ. Suppose that
n ≥ 2. We show that the mechanism (A3) is dominated by the mechanism:
q˜ (θ) =

xn if θ ∈
(
θ, xn+xn−1
2
)
xi if θ ∈
(xi+xi+1
2
, xi−1+xi
2
)
, n− 1 ≥ i ≥ 2
x1 if θ ∈
(
x1+x2
2
, x1
)
θ if θ ∈ (x1, θ¯) .
(A4)
The mechanisms q (·) and q˜ (·) are the same except for the discontinuity at an of q (·)
which is smoothed in q˜ (·).
Taking the difference d = Eθ(V (q˜ (θ) , θ) − V (q (θ) , θ)) and performing calculations
we have
d =
1
2
∫ an
θ
(xn+1 − θ − δ)2 f (θ) dθ − 1
2
∫ an
θ
(xn − θ − δ)2 f (θ) dθ
=
1
2
∫ an
θ
(xn+1 − xn) (xn + xn+1 − 2θ − 2δ) f (θ) dθ
=
1
2
∫ an
θ
(xn − xn+1) (2θ + 2δ − (xn + xn−1)) f (θ) dθ.
Since xn − xn+1 > 0, the sign of d is the same as the sign of:
1
2
∫ an
θ
(2θ + 2δ − (xn + xn+1)) f (θ) dθ = δF (an)− (xn + xn+1)
2
F (an) +
∫ an
θ
θf (θ) dθ
= δF (an)−
∫ an
θ
F (θ) dθ > 0.
The last inequality follows from log-concavity of F (·), the form of δ in (8) and an < θ̂.
Therefore Ef (V (q˜ (θ) , θ)) > Ef (V (q (θ) , θ)) which contradicts the optimality of q (·) . So,
the mechanism must have at most one point of discontinuity a1 ≥ θˆ > x2 :
q (θ) =

x2 if θ < a1
x1 if a1 < θ < x1
θ if θ > x1.
(A5)
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c) We have established that the optimal mechanism with a discontinuity at a1 has the
form given by (A5). We prove now that this mechanism is not optimal in the case of a
symmetric, single-peaked distribution. Namely it is dominated by the mechanism:
q∗ (θ) =
{
x2 if θ < x2
θ if θ > x2.
Consider the difference d∗ = Ef (V (q∗ (θ) , θ)− V (q (θ) , θ)) then we have
d∗ =
1
2
∫ a1
x2
(x2 − θ − δ)2 f (θ) dθ + 1
2
∫ x1
a1
(x1 − θ − δ)2 f (θ) dθ
−1
2
∫ a1
x2
δ2f (θ) dθ − 1
2
∫ x1
a1
δ2f (θ) dθ
=
1
2
∫ a1
x2
(x2 − θ − 2δ) (x2 − θ) f (θ) dθ + 1
2
∫ x1
a1
(x1 − θ − 2δ) (x1 − θ) f (θ) dθ.
In the first integral in the expression above, we change variables and introduce θ˜ =
x1 + x2 − θ. Then we have∫ a1
x2
(x2 − θ − 2δ) (x2 − θ) f (θ) dθ =
∫ x1
a1
(
θ˜ − 2δ − x1
)(
θ˜ − x1
)
f
(
x1 + x2 − θ˜
)
dθ˜ (A6)
=
∫ x1
a1
(
2δ + x1 − θ˜
)(
x1 − θ˜
)
f
(
x1 + x2 − θ˜
)
dθ˜
>
∫ x1
a1
(
2δ + x1 − θ˜
)(
x1 − θ˜
)
f
(
θ˜
)
dθ˜.
For the last inequality, we use two facts. First,
(
2δ + x1 − θ˜
)(
x1 − θ˜
)
> 0 for
θ˜ ∈ (a1, x1) . Second, f
(
x1 + x2 − θ˜
)
≥ f
(
θ˜
)
. Indeed, since f(·) is symmetric around
Ef (θ), f
(
x1 + x2 − θ˜
)
= f (2Ef (θ) + θ − (x1 + x2)). Now, since f(·) is single-peaked
and 2Ef (θ) + θ − (x1 + x2) ≤ θ˜ we have the second inequality.
Using (A6) we can find a lower bound on the difference d∗ and we get
d∗ >
1
2
∫ x1
a1
(
2δ + x1 − θ˜
)(
x1 − θ˜
)
f
(
θ˜
)
dθ˜ − 1
2
∫ x1
a1
(θ + 2δ − x1) (x1 − θ) f (θ) dθ
=
1
2
∫ x1
a1
(2x1 − 2θ) (x1 − θ) f (θ) dθ > 0.
Therefore d∗ > 0 which contradicts with optimality of q (θ).
The case of an infinite support with a countable non-dense set of discontinuities.
d) Suppose now that the optimal mechanism q (θ)has an infinite but countable number
of discontinuities at points a1 > a2 > ... > an > ... Also suppose for a while that, to the
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left of the expected value, there are no intervals where the agent’s ideal point is chosen.
Then we must have
q (θ) =
 xi if θ ∈
(xi+xi+1
2
, xi−1+xi
2
)
, n− 1 ≥ i ≥ 2
x1 if θ ∈
(
x1+x2
2
, x1
)
θ if θ ∈ (x1,∞) .
Consider the system of mechanisms {qk (θ)}∞k=2 defined by:
qk (θ) =

xk if θ ∈
(−∞, xk+xn−1
2
)
xi if θ ∈
(xi+xi+1
2
, xi−1+xi
2
)
, k − 1 ≥ i ≥ 2
x1 if θ ∈
(
x1+x2
2
, x1
)
θ if θ ∈ (x1,∞) .
From b) we know thatEf (V (q2 (θ) , θ)) > Ef (V (q3 (θ) , θ)) > · · · > Ef (V (qk (θ) , θ)) >
· · · . Suppose Ef (V (q2 (θ) , θ))− Ef (V (q3 (θ) , θ)) = ε. Then there exists n such that:
Ef (V (q (θ) , θ))− Ef (V (qn (θ) , θ)) < 1
2
∫ an
−∞
(xn − θ − δ)2 f (θ) dθ < ε.
Indeed∫ an
−∞
θ2f (θ) dθ −
∫ an
−∞
(xn − θ − δ)2 f (θ) dθ =
∫ an
−∞
(xn − δ) (2θ + δ − xn) f (θ) dθ.
We have xn < δ and∫ an
−∞
(2θ + δ − xn) f (θ) dθ = 2xn−1F (an)− 2
∫ an
−∞
F (θ) dθ + δF (an) < 0
for xn−1 sufficiently negative. That means that
lim
xn→−∞
∫ an
−∞
(xn − θ − δ)2 f (θ) dθ = 0.
Therefore, we have
Ef (V (q (θ) , θ)) < Ef (V (qn (θ) , θ) = ε.
From this inequality, we deduce that replacing the initial mechanism q (θ) by the one-
jump mechanism q2 (θ) strictly increases the expected utility of the principal. Now we
just have to use steps of c) to prove that q2 (θ) is dominated by a continuous mechanism.
e) Using a) and d) we can easily prove that there are no interval to the left of the
expected value where the mechanism coincides with the agent’s ideal point.
The case of the dense set of discontinuities.
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Since for the finite support we can always start from the beginning of the interval
the previous techniques is applicable. If the condensation point is θ then we always can
replace the mechanism on small interval (θ, δ) by the agent’s ideal point and then proceed
as in a). The loss of optimality from replacing the initial mechanism by the agent’s ideal
point can be made arbitrarily small. Then, since the finite interval is a compact set we
can focus on finite sequence of mechanisms each of whom dominates the previous one and
the last mechanism in this sequence is continuous.
For infinite support the same argument applies. We just have to apply techniques of
section d) - we can ”cut” the mechanism from the left and replace it by the rigid policy
there. Doing this we can arbitrarily closely approach the initial mechanism. Then the
previous considerations for the finite support are applicable since we do not have to bother
about the mechanism to the right of the expected value.
• Proof of Proposition 3: Note first that δ = ϕ(θˆ(δ)). Because ϕ(·) is increasing when
F (·) is log-concave, θˆ(δ) increases with δ. Using the Envelope Theorem:
V˙ (δ) =
∫ θˆ(δ)
θ
(θˆ(δ)− θ − δ)f(θ)dθ − δ(1− F (θˆ(δ))).
Because (7) holds, the first term on the r.h.s. is zero and V˙ (δ) = −δ(1−F (θˆ(δ))) < 0.
Also, we have:
U˙(δ) = −
(∫ θˆ(δ)
θ
(θˆ(δ)− θ)f(θ)dθ
)
d
dδ
θˆ(δ) = −δF (θˆ(δ)) d
dδ
θˆ(δ) < 0.
• Proof of Proposition 4: Using the Envelope Theorem, we get:
2V˙ (σ) = δ2
∂G
∂σ
(θˆ(σ), σ)−
∫ θˆ(σ)
−∞
(θˆ(σ)− θ − δ)2 ∂g
∂σ
(θ, σ)dθ.
Integrating by parts,
V˙ (σ) = −
∫ θˆ(σ)
−∞
(θˆ(σ)− θ − δ)∂G
∂σ
(θ, σ)dθ
= −
∫ θˆ(σ)
−∞
∂G
∂σ
(θ, σ)
g(θ, σ)
(
g(θ, σ)(θˆ(σ)− θ − δ)
)
dθ.
Integrating by parts again,
V˙ (σ) =
∫ θˆ(σ)
−∞
(∫ θ
−∞
(θˆ(σ)− θ˜ − δ)g(θ˜, σ)dθ˜
)
∂
∂θ
(
∂G
∂σ
(θ, σ)
g(θ, σ)
)
dθ.
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Note that
∂G
∂σ
(θ,σ)
g(θ,σ)
= θ
σ
and that, by definition of θˆ(σ),∫ θ
−∞
(θˆ(σ)− θ˜ − δ)g(θ˜, σ)dθ˜ ≥ 0 for θ ≤ θˆ(σ).
Therefore, V˙ (σ) ≥ 0.
For the interest group, we have:
U(σ) = −1
2
(∫ θˆ(σ)
−∞
(θˆ(σ)− θ)2g(θ, σ)dθ
)
.
Thus,
U˙(σ) = −1
2
(
2
(∫ θˆ(σ)
−∞
(θˆ(σ)− θ)g(θ, σ)dθ
)
d
dσ
θˆ(σ) +
∫ θˆ(σ)
−∞
(θˆ(σ)− θ)2 ∂
∂σ
g(θ, σ)dθ
)
and
U˙(σ) = −1
2
(∫ θˆ(σ)
−∞
(θˆ(σ)− θ)2f(θ, σ)dθ + 2
(∫ θˆ(σ)
−∞
(θˆ(σ)− θ)f(θ, σ)dθ
)(
1 + σ
d
dσ
θˆ(σ)
))
.
Finally, since d
dσ
θˆ(σ) > 0 we get that U˙(σ) < 0.
• Proof of Proposition 5: First, we prove the following Lemma:
Lemma 4 : The optimal mechanism for the distribution G(·) corresponding to the coali-
tion is necessarily continuous.
Proof: First, consider the following property of the optimal mechanism q(θ) which is a
direct consequence of Lemma 2. If at a point x for ∆ such that both x + ∆ and x −∆
belong to Θ, the following is true: for all t ∈ (0,∆)
f(x− t)− δf ′(x− t) + f(x+ t)− δf ′(x+ t) > 0 (A7)
then there is no discontinuity of the optimal mechanism on [x−∆, x+ ∆] of the type
q(θ) =
{
x−∆ if x−∆ ≤ θ < x,
x+ ∆ if x < θ ≤ x+ ∆. (A8)
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Indeed, consider the function ϕ (t), defined on [0,∆] by
ϕ (t) = δ (2F (x)− F (x− t)− F (x+ t))−
−
∫ x
x−t
F (y) dy +
∫ x+t
x
F (y) dy.
Then, if the condition (A7) is satisfied we have ϕ (0) = 0 and ϕ′ (t) > 0. Therefore
ϕ (∆) > 0 and acting as in the proof of Lemma 2 we get that the optimal mechanism
cannot have discontinuity of type (A8).
From the proof of Proposition 2, we know that, if there is a discontinuity of the
optimal mechanism then it is unique. Suppose, we have an optimal mechanism with a
discontinuity at x of the form (A8). Five cases should be considered depending on the
locations of x−∆, x and x+ ∆.
1. 1 > x+ ∆ > x−∆ > 1
2
= Eg(θ). Then, since the whole interval [x−∆, x+ ∆] lies
on the interval where the density is decreasing, that mechanism is thus dominated
by the mechanism which is identical to q(θ) except on the interval [x − ∆, x + ∆]
where q(θ) is replaced by θ.
2. 0 < x −∆ < 1
2
< x + ∆ < 1. Taking into account the expression of g(·), (A7) can
be rewritten as:
x−∆− δ + 1− x−∆ + δ = 1− 2∆ > 0,
which holds for ∆ < 1
2
.
3. x+ ∆ < 1
2
. We have
x−∆− δ + x+ ∆ + δ = 2(x− δ).
So (A7) holds when x > δ. If x < δ < θ̂, then it is easy to see (as in the proof of
Proposition 2) that q(θ) is dominated by
q˜(θ) =
{
x+ ∆ if θ < x+ ∆,
θ if x+ ∆ < θ,
4. x −∆ < 0. If θˆ > x + ∆, then, as in the proof of Proposition 2 we can show that
the mechanism q(θ) is dominated. Therefore we can consider the case θˆ < x + ∆,
then q(θ) is dominated if34
f(x−∆)− δf ′(x−∆) > 0. (A9)
34If x−∆ < θ then condition (A7) becomes
f(x+ ∆)− δf ′(x+ ∆) > 0
if θˆ ≤ x+ ∆.
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There are two cases to consider; If x+ ∆ < 1
2
then (A8) becomes
x+ ∆− δ > 0
which is true, since otherwise, we have x + ∆ < δ < θˆ, a contradiction with the
assumption.
If x+ ∆ > 1
2
then (A8) holds since the inequality 1− x−∆ + δ > 0 is always true.
5. x+ ∆ > 1. In this case, it is easy to see that: if x > 1
2
, then the gains of smoothing
the mechanism are bigger than the losses, if x < 1
2
, then since x + ∆ > 1, we have
x−∆ < 0 and the mechanism is dominated by the rigid mechanism x+ ∆.
Putting everything together, we can conclude that the optimal mechanism for the
coalition with uniform priors is continuous.
Our purpose is now to compare the principal’s expected payoffs in the one-agent setting
and with a coalition. For the case of one agent, the expected utility of the principal as a
function of the level of the conflict δ is written as
V (δ) = −1
2
{∫ 2δ
0
(δ − θ)2dθ + δ2(1− 2δ)
}
.
In front of a coalition, his expected payoff for δ > 1
6
is written as
VM(δ) = −2
∫ 1/2
0
(θˆg − θ − δ)2θdθ
−2
∫ θˆg
1/2
(θˆg − θ − δ)2(1− θ)dθ − 1
2
δ2(1−G(θˆg))).
Where θˆg is determined by (10) and G(θˆg) = 1−2(1− θˆg)2 is c.d.f. for the convolution.
Taking the difference dV (θˆg(δ)) = VM(δ) − V (δ) and using (10) for δ = δ(θˆg) we get
the following expression which is positive for all θˆg ∈ [1/2, 1]
dV (θˆg)) =
1
1296
(
1− 4θˆg + 2θˆ2g
)3[− 5 + 108θˆg − 1062θˆ2g + 6000θˆ3g − 20772θˆ4g
+44784θˆ5g − 59640θˆ6g + 47808θˆ7g − 22176θˆ8g + 5504θˆ9g − 576θˆ10g
]
.
It can be shown that dV
(
1
2
)
= 0.00038 > 0 and dV (θˆg) is increasing on [1/2, 1].
It suggests to us that for smaller values of δ, dV (θˆg) is less than zero and the one-agent
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structure dominates a coalition. Indeed, for δ < 1
6
from Lemma 4, the optimal mechanism
is continuous with θˆg(δ) = 3δ > θˆf (δ) = 2δ.
VM(δ)− V (δ) = −1
2
∫ θˆg(δ)
0
(θˆg(δ)− θ − δ)2g(θ)dθ − 1
2
δ2(1−G(θˆg(δ)))
+
1
2
∫ θˆf (δ)
0
(θˆf (δ)− θ − δ)2f(θ)dθ + 1
2
δ2(1− F (θˆf (δ)))
= −2
∫ 3δ
0
(2δ − θ)2θdθ − 1
2
δ2(1− 18δ2) + 1
2
∫ 2δ
0
(δ − θ)2dθ + 1
2
δ2(1− 2δ)
=
δ2
6
(27δ − 4).
We obtain that, for δ ≥ 4
27
, the payoff of the principal for coalition VM(δ) is greater
that his payoff in the one-agent setting V (δ). For δ ≤ 4
27
, the reverse is true.
For the interest groups, we compare the expected utility of one group U (δ) = −1
2
∫ 2δ
0
(2δ − θ)2 dθ
with half the expected utility of the merged group which can be rewritten for simplicity
as UM(δ) = −12
∫ θˆg
0
(θˆg − θ)2g(θ)dθ − 148 (here we use the equality Ef
(
(θ2−θ1)2
8
)
= 1
48
).
Then the difference d′(θˆg(δ)) = UM(θˆg)− U(δ) is equal to
d′(θˆg) =
(1− θˆg)
(
−1− 10θˆg + 251θˆ2g − 1627θˆ3g + 5222θˆ4g − 9610θˆ5g + 10484θˆ6g − 6292θˆ7g + 1880θˆ8g − 216θˆ9g
)
162(1− 4θˆg + 2θˆ2g)3
and for δ ≤ 1
6
, d′(θˆg(δ)) = 148(1 − 64δ3 + 648δ4). It can be seen that d′(θˆg) > 0 for
θˆg ∈ [0, 1]. Intuitively U(δ) > UM(δ) because 2δ < θˆg i.e. the kink of one-agent scheme is
located to the left of the kink of the optimal mechanism for a coalition and therefore, for
the one-agent scheme the region, where the optimal mechanism coincides with the agent’s
first best is bigger than for coalition.
• Proof of Proposition 6: We first prove the following Lemma:
Lemma 5 : For the normal distribution N(0, 1
σ2
), the optimal mechanism is continuous
and unique when δσ >
√
2
pi
. The cut-off θˆ(σ) is then an increasing function of σ.
Proof : The normal distribution is log-concave. We know from Proposition 2 that the
optimal mechanism if it is continuous is necessarily unique. From (7), we have
(θˆ(σ)− δ)F (θˆ(σ), σ) =
∫ θˆ(σ)
−∞
θf(θ, σ)dθ = σ
∫ θˆ(σ)
−∞
θe−
θ2σ2
2 dθ√
2pi
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where F (θ, σ) is the c.d.f. for N(0, 1
σ2
). Thus we find
δ = θˆ(σ) +
f(θˆ(σ), σ)
σ2F (θˆ(σ), σ)
. (A10)
The right-hand side of (A10), viewed as a function of θˆ, is increasing in θˆ and goes to
infinity and for δσ >
√
2
pi
, θˆ(η) always exists and is necessarily positive. Proposition 2
then applies to ensure continuity of the optimal mechanism.
To prove Proposition 6, note then that, as two groups merge, z = θ1+θ2
2
follows
N(0, 1
2σ2
). The result follows from Proposition 4.
• Proof of Lemma 3: First, consider the sets Pi = P li ∪ P ri , i = 1, 2 where
P l1 =
{
(θ1, θ2)|∀θˆ, θˆ < θ1, q(θˆ, θ2) = q(θ1, θ2)
}
,
and
P r1 =
{
(θ1, θ2)|∀θˆ, θˆ > θ1, q(θ1, θ2) = q(θˆ, θ2)
}
.
The sets P1 and P2 are sets of pooling on θ1 and θ2 respectively and, for example, P
l
1
is a pooling part (on θ1) of the continuous mechanisms for each value of θ2 started from
the left of the area Θ×Θ.
Using dominant strategy incentive compatibility we observe that the sets P li and P
u
i
have continuous graphs, i.e., for example the function s(θ2) = sup(θ1,θ2)∈P l1 θ1 is continuous.
So, both sets P1 and P2 are closed sets.
Since a dominant strategy incentive compatible scheme along lines which are parallel to
axes has to be either flat or coincides with the first best of the agents it is straightforward
to see that the boundaries of sets P li are straight lines which are either vertical (horizontal)
for P j1 (P
j
2 ) or belong to the diagonal of Θ×Θ.
By symmetry we restrict ourselves to the area {(θ1, θ2) s.t. θ1 > θ2} and we construct
the dominant strategy incentive compatible scheme moving from (θ, θ) to the right.
Define θ∗ from P l1∩P l2 = {(θ1, θ2) s.t. θ1 ≤ θ∗, θ2 ≤ θ∗} .35 There are possible three sit-
uations: a) the mechanism q(θ1, θ2) coincides with θ1 on S = {(θ1, θ2) s.t. θ1 ≤ θ∗ + ε, θ2 ≤ θ∗ + ε};
b) we have sup(θ1,θ2)∈P l1∩P l2 θ1 = θ; c) the mechanism q(θ1, θ2) coincides with θ2 on S
′ =
{(θ1, θ2) s.t. θ1 ≤ ε, θ2 ≤ ε} .36 In the cases b) and c) we set up θ∗ = θ∗∗ = θ. Since
the continuous mechanism cannot be interrupted by the region of pooling we have that
the next to the right pooling area P r1 ∩ P l2 ends up in the right frontier of Θ × Θ and
35In the case P l1 ∩ P l2 = ∅ we set up θ∗ to be equal to θ.
36This is possible only in case P l1 ∩ P l2 = ∅.
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constitutes a rectangle {(θ1, θ2) s.t. θ1 ≥ θ∗∗, θ2 ≤ θ∗∗} .37 In the area up to P r1 ∩ P l2 for
{(θ1, θ2) s.t. θ1 > θ2} there are possible two cases: either b = θ or q(θ1, θ2) coincides with
θ2. Finally the mechanism will reach the area P
r
1∩P r2 = {(θ1, θ2) s.t. θ1 ≥ θ∗∗∗, θ2 ≥ θ∗∗∗}.38
• Proof of Proposition 7: Let us provide a Lemma which shows the conditions under
which continuity of that dominant strategy mechanism arises.
Lemma 6 : For distributions satisfying condition (7), the optimal dominant strategy
incentive compatible mechanism q(·) is necessarily continuous.
Proof: Suppose that, at point a = (a1, a2) we have a discontinuity of the optimal mech-
anism. There are two possible cases: either a1 > a2 or a1 < a2. Suppose, without loss of
generality, that a1 > a2. Then it has to be that for one of the uni-dimensional mechanisms
determined by θ1 = a1 or θ2 = a2 and q (θ1, θ2) there is a discontinuity at either point
a2 or a1 correspondingly. Note that it cannot be the case that there are discontinuities
in both cases simultaneously. Now suppose first that, for the uni-dimensional mechanism
θ2 = a2, there is a discontinuity at point a1.
Then the points of discontinuity close to a = (a1, a2) constitute a straight line up to
the line θ1 = θ2 By symmetry we must have a symmetric line of points of discontinuity
at θ2 = a1.
Replacing the mechanism by θ1 on flat regions in area θ1 > θ2 and by θ2 on θ1 < θ2
and using the argument of Lemma 2 we conclude that the original mechanism can be
improved.
The second case is possible, when at point a = (a1, a2), there is a uni-dimensional
discontinuity for θ1 = a1. Here we replace the mechanism by θ2 on area θ1 > θ2 and by θ1
on θ1 < θ2.
Remark 1: First we prove that the optimal mechanism has indeed the form (14). If
we denote by V (θ∗, θ∗∗, θ∗∗∗) the payoff of the principal for general dominant strategy
incentive compatible scheme then it is easy to see, that for a uniform distribution:
∂V
∂θ∗∗∗
= −1
2
(1− θ∗∗∗)2 (1 + 2δ − θ∗∗∗) < 0
Therefore θ∗∗∗ = θ = 1.
Remark 2: We need the values of kinks θ∗ and θ∗∗ for the optimal mechanism (14).
37θ∗∗ might be equal to θ.
38In case P r1 ∩ P r2 = ∅ we set up θ∗∗∗ = θ.
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They can be determined for general distribution by the first-order conditions:∫ θ∗
θ
(∫ θ1
θ
(
θast − θ1 + θ2
2
− δ
)
f (θ2) dθ2
)
f (θ1) dθ1 = 0 (A11)∫ θ
θ∗∗
(∫ θ∗∗
θ
(
θ∗∗ − θ1 + θ2
2
− δ
)
f (θ2) dθ2
)
f (θ1) dθ1 = 0.
After manipulations we get:
δ =
1
F (θ∗)
∫ θ∗
θ
F (θ) dθ. (A12)
and
θ∗∗ = Ef (θ) + δ (1− F (θ∗∗)) +
∫ θ∗∗
θ
F (θ) dθ −
∫ θ∗∗
θ
F (θ) dθ
F (θ∗∗)
(A13)
Note that the formula for θ∗ is the same as in a single-agent framework. For a uniform
distribution, we get some particularly simple expressions (15):
θ∗ = 2δ
θ∗∗ =
1
2
+ 2δ
We can conclude that for δ ∈ [1
4
, 1
2
]
the optimal dominant strategy mechanism has
a form with one cut-off value θ∗ = 2δ and for δ ∈ [0, 1
4
]
there are two cut-off values
θ∗ = 2δ and θ∗∗ = 1
2
+ 2δ. In order to prove Proposition 7 we have to consider three cases
depending on the value of the conflict δ.
Consider the case δ ∈ [1
4
, 1
]
. The cases δ ∈ [1
6
, 1
4
]
and δ ∈ [0, 1
6
]
are treated similarly.
For a coalition between groups, the optimal mechanism yields to the decision-maker:
VM(θˆg) = −1
2
∫ θˆg
0
∫ θˆg
0
(
θˆg − θ1 + θ2
2
− δ
)2
dθ2dθ1
−
∫ 1
θˆ
(∫ 2θˆg−θ1
0
(
θˆg − θ1 + θ2
2
− δ
)2
dθ2
)
dθ1
−
∫ 1
θˆg
(∫ θ1
2θˆg−θ1
δ2dθ2
)
dθ1,
where θˆg is the cut-off in the case of a coalition.
Let us consider now the dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism such that
θ∗ = θˆg. It yields to the decision-maker an expected payoff
VD(θˆg) = −1
2
∫ θˆg
0
∫ θˆg
0
(
θˆg − θ1 + θ2
2
− δ
)2
dθ2dθ1
−
∫ 1
θˆg
(∫ θ1
0
(
θ1 − θ1 + θ2
2
− δ
)2
dθ2
)
dθ1.
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Considering the difference VD(θˆg) − VM(θˆg) and taking into account that the first
members are the same we have:
VD(θˆg)− VM(θˆg) = 1
24
(1− θˆg)2
(
2θˆg(1 + 12δ)− 1− 7θˆ2g
)
(A14)
Using the expression (10) for δ, the sign of (A14) is the same as the sign of the
expression:
2θˆ4g − 16θˆ3g + 7θˆ2g + 2θˆg − 1
2θˆ2g − 4θˆg + 1
which is positive for θˆg ∈
[
1
2
, 1
]
.39
Let us turn to the interest groups. We consider the optimal mechanisms in both cases
(coalition and decentralization) for arbitrary δ ∈ [1
4
, 1
2
]. The expected utility of such a
group in a coalition is:
UM
(
θˆg(δ)
)
= −1
2
∫ 2θˆg(δ)−1
0
(∫ 1
0
(
θˆg − θ1
)2
dθ2
)
dθ1 −
−1
2
∫ 1
2θˆg(δ)−1
(∫ 2θˆg(δ)−θ1
0
(
θˆg(δ)− θ1
)2
dθ2 +
∫ 1
2θˆg(δ)−θ1
(
θ1 + θ2
2
− θ1
)2
dθ2
)
dθ1 =
=
1
6
θˆg(δ)
(
−1 + 3θˆg(δ)− 4θˆ2g(δ) + θˆ3g(δ)
)
where θˆg(δ) is determined by (10).
40 In the case of the decentralized mechanism, we have
instead:
UD
(
θˆf (δ)
)
= −1
2
∫ θˆf (δ)
0
∫ θˆf (δ)
0
(
θˆf (δ)− θ1
)2
dθ2dθ1 − 1
2
∫ 1
θˆf (δ)
(∫ θ2
0
(θ2 − θ1)2dθ1
)
dθ2 =
= − 1
24
(
1 + 3θˆ4f (δ)
)
here θˆf (δ) = 2δ.
It can be shown that the difference between expected utilities: UD
(
θˆf (δ)
)
−UM
(
θˆg(δ)
)
is
positive for δ ∈ [1
4
, 1
2
]. Therefore for groups UM
(
θˆg(δ)
)
< UD
(
θˆf (δ)
)
.41
39Computations for δ ≤ 14 show that VD > VM for δ > δ∗ ≈ 0.11 and for δ < δ∗, VM > VD.
40Equation (11) has three parametrical roots x1(δ), x2(δ), x3(δ). We have to select the one for which
xi( 12 ) = 1.
41We can show that for δ > δ∗∗ ∈ [ 16 , 14 ], UD > UM and for δ < δ∗∗, we have the reverse.
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